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The Privileged Working Conditions of
Public Employees Sanctioned by Public
Law: Adding One Dimension to Inequality
Paolo D’Anselmi†
1. Introduction
Public law includes provisions about public administration
mandates and organization, and likewise it defines civil service
status and working conditions. This Paper argues that such
provisions are based on the implicit hypothesis that the “received
view” of Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy is a good predictor of
public administrations’ capabilities and organizational behavior. In
other words, public administration that is organized according to
our understanding (or “received view”1) of Max Weber, will
implement efficiently, effectively, and unambiguously whatever
public policy the government will formulate. This Paper also argues
that such public law provisions create privileged working conditions
for public employees, thus adding one dimension to inequality that
is wholly man-made and sanctioned by the law.
This Paper joins the debate about inequality and public
management reform. Authors have been thinking about equality—
and inequality—mostly in terms of income and wealth2 and less in
terms of living and working conditions, e.g. the digital divide. 3
Adding to the literature about inequality in working conditions, this
†. Paolo D’Anselmi, Ph.D candidate 2020, Guildhall School of Business and
Law, London Metropolitan University. Paolo holds a Master of Electrical
Engineering from Sapienza, Rome, and a Master of Public Policy from Harvard
Kennedy School. A small entrepreneur throughout the 1990s, Paolo is a practitioner
of management consultancy. He is the author of VALUES AND STAKEHOLDERS IN AN
ERA OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CUT-THROAT COMPETITION? (London: Palgrave,
2011). He teaches Global Strategic Management at the University of Craiova,
Romania.
1. The “received view” of Weberian thought was proposed to the Author in a
discussion with Sam Whimster who has edited multiple works on Weberian theory.
Email from Sam Whimster to Paolo D’Anselmi, author (Aug. 22, 2018, 12:10 PM) (on
file with author).
2. See generally ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE
DONE? (2015); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE (2015); JEAN DRÈZE & AMARTYA SEN, AN UNCERTAIN
GLORY: INDIA AND ITS CONTRADICTIONS (2013).
3. See generally JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF
HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE (2000).
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Paper shows that a significant amount of value, or ‘shadow’ income,
can be perceived from a person’s working conditions,4 and this is the
case of public employees globally. On the other hand, there is debate
about public law5 and management reform6 that explicitly
acknowledges the Weberian origin of public administration’s
organizational arrangements. In Section 2, the paper discusses that
public employees’ status comes from Weber. Section 3 argues that
such status is privileged. Section 4 discusses the relevance of this
new dimension of inequality and its limitations. Section 5 draws
conclusions and puts forth a possible future research program.
2. Public Employees’ Working Conditions Come from Weber
The proposition that public employees’ working conditions
come from Weber will be dealt with in two steps: (1) public law
scholars are aware of their Weberian hypothesis about
organizational arrangements and organizational behavior; and (2)
the received view of Weber generates the working conditions of
public employees.
The link between the working conditions and their origin from
Weberian theory is not necessary to show that those conditions are
privileged. However, it is necessary to show that those conditions
are law-made and useful to show that those conditions globally have
a common etiology and theoretical basis. We want to show those
conditions are an unintended consequence of purposive design by
public law.7 In case we obtain a positive result in showing the
privilege, we would need to go back to their theoretical basis in
order to amend public law: an important consequence.
It is also worthwhile mentioning at this stage that studies, old
and new, while acknowledging the relevance of the study of

4. See generally THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO REWARD MANAGEMENT
(Stephen J. Perkins ed., 2019) (providing a compilation of different perspectives
regarding rewarding people in employment).
5. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 634
(2000).
6. See Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr., What Is a Neo-Weberian State? Reflections on a
Concept and Its Implications, 1 NISPACEE J. PUB. ADMIN. POL’Y 17 (2008);
CHRISTOPHER POLLITT & GEERT BOUCKAERT, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS — NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE, AND THE NEOWEBERIAN STATE (3d ed. 2011).
7. POLLITT & BOUCKAERT, supra note 6, at 118 (listing among the Weberian
elements of the Neo-Weberian State: “[p]reservation of the idea of a public service
with a distinctive status, culture, and . . . terms and conditions”).

34

Inequality Inquiry

[Vol. 3: 32

bureaucracy to many sciences, appear to have neglected its impact
on law.8
2.1. Public Law Scholars Are Aware of Their Weberian
Hypothesis about Public Employees
Public law scholars are aware of their Weberian hypothesis
about public employees. The following is an example of public law
doctrine applied to the received view of Max Weber’s theory of
bureaucracy as an explicit hypothesis in a passage from eminent
constitutionalist Bruce Ackerman. Ackerman’s vision of a functional
specialization between politics and public administration “requires a
candid assessment of a nation’s cultural and human resources.”9 His
key passage for our purpose is the following:
Before functional separation can make sense, there must be the
makings of something I shall call a “Weberian culture.” At least
some talented people must find inspiration in the prospect of
professional service to the state. Otherwise, the functional
separation of powers will serve merely as a fig leaf for
corruption and clientelism . . . . Public-spirited specialists
are . . . in short supply in many parts of the world — in which
case there will be many more important things to worry about
than the functional separation of powers.10

Professor Ackerman acknowledges he is assuming a public
administration that will work according to Max Weber’s mandate
and will implement efficiently, effectively, and unambiguously
whatever public policy the government will formulate. What
Ackerman makes explicit in this passage is widely echoed in
documents of global public organizations and in the global media.
In fact, Ackerman’s hypothesis about the existence of a “Weberian
culture” and “public-spirited” specialists speaks to the notion of a
class of ‘higher echelons’11 in public administration implied in

8. See generally MARTIN ALBROW, BUREAUCRACY 13 (1970) (“Political scientists,
sociologists, management scientists have all devoted major pieces of theory and
research to bureaucracy.”); Lynn, supra note 6, at 17 (mentioning only the
“literatures of political science, sociology, and public affairs”).
9. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 690.
10. Id. A limitation of this quotation is that it is twenty years old. However, it
should be noted that Professor Ackerman’s current work still includes the
acknowledgement of Weberian “bureaucratic rationality.” See BRUCE ACKERMAN,
REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW
1 (2019).
11. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1418 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978) (1956).
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today’s media.12 The widespread notion about public
administration’s ‘higher echelons’ (higher ranks) is that it is
sufficient that public executives respond to the Weberian ideal type
and the whole public administration will prove as the most efficient
and rational way to carry out an organized task. Such Weberian
thinking also permeates many international and national public
organizations’ management and policy.13
Ackerman’s hypothesis also raises a question about what
exactly the public administration literature is dealing with: is it the
hundreds of millions of people (and their higher echelons) who are
employed by governments, or is it only the higher echelons
themselves? This article argues that the Weberian hypothesis de
facto applies to all public employees, not only to their higher
echelons—as will be discussed in the next section on the received
view of Weber’s theory, which is widely applied to all of public
administration.14 Likewise, the intellectual and emotional
nourishment of “public-spirited specialists” is the basic tenet of
many schools of public administration around the world, including
the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), which Ackerman mentions
explicitly.15 These schools work under the Weberian hypothesis
whereby training and endowing as many public employees as

12. See generally Bureaucratic Blight, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2019, at 25;
Mandarin Lessons, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2014, at 47; Aiwa (Yes) Minister,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 2015, at 53; From Red Tape to Joined-up Government,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2016, at 1.
13. See INT’L MONETARY FUND (IMF), FISCAL AFFAIRS AND LEGAL DEPARTMENTS,
CORRUPTION: COSTS AND MITIGATING STRATEGIES,
iii
(May
2016),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1605.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANV2LJ47] (“Perhaps most importantly, however, addressing corruption requires effective
institutions. . . . [T]he objective is clear: the development of a competent civil service
that takes pride in being independent of both private influence and public
interference.”).
14. To provide a feeling for quantities, in the U.S. there are approximately 2
million federal executive branch employees and about 22 million federal, state, and
local government employees. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES BY OWNERSHIP: FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED SCHOOLS AND
HOSPITALS AND THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (May 2018), https://www.bls.gov/
oes/current/999001.htm [https://perma.cc/VB5T-FXAM]; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, NATIONAL INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE
ESTIMATES: NAICS 999100 – FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH (OES DESIGNATION)
(May
2018),
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_999100.htm
[https://perma.cc/5XCU-FN4Y]. To provide an idea of the relevance of such a
workforce, the total employed population of the U.S. is about 161 million. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE 1.2 EMPLOYMENT BY DETAILED OCCUPATION,
2018 AND PROJECTED 2028, https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/emp-by-detailedoccupation.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA2D-ZPB8].
15. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 687, 690, 715.
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possible with the ‘right’ skills will result in better public
administrations—and they, the schools, will have made ‘a
difference.’ Such an all-out effort and an expectation of publicspiritedness appears to be aimed not only at the higher echelons,
but to the whole body of employees on public payroll globally.16
2.2. The “Received View” of Weber
Having provided some evidence that indeed public law abides
by Weberian philosophy, at least from a normative point of view, let
us discuss the “received view” of Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy
that public law is practicing and what that received view exactly is.
The “received view” of Weber refers to the current understanding of
Weber’s theory of bureaucracy in public discourse. It refers to what
we have understood, what we have retained, and how we have
implemented Weber. It is a cautious way to refer to Weber’s
thinking since it would be very strong to say, “This is what Weber
really said and what Weber really meant.”
The received view of Weber can be summarized in two ‘recipes’
for obtaining the highest degree of efficiency of public
administration through bureaucratic arrangements: (1) context and
structure of the public administration organization; and (2) status
of the civil servant.17 In teaching Weber today, Professor Iván
Szelényi at Yale University highlights the following characteristics
of Weber’s ‘recipe’ for the context and structure of a legal-rational
authority: (i) continuous rule bound conduct, (ii) a specific sphere of
competence (or jurisdiction), (iii) a hierarchy of right of appeal, (iv)
specialized training for administrative staff, and (v) complete staff
separation from ownership of the means of production or
administration.18 The second Weberian ‘recipe’ Professor Szelényi
discusses is the characteristics of bureaucracy and bureaucrats,
where staff members are: (i) personally free, (ii) organized by
hierarchy of office, (iii) employed by free contract on a fixed salary
and hired on the basis of technical qualifications, and (iv) employed
solely by the office such that it constitutes a career. 19 As portrayed
16. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN Ch. XXIII (1651) (answering the question by
enumerating, rather extensively, on whom is to be regarded as a public minister).
17. See WEBER, supra note 11.
18. Iván Szelényi, Lecture 20: Weber on Legal-Rational Authority, at 9:11–14:30,
Yale Open Course (Fall 2009), https://oyc.yale.edu/sociology/socy-151/lecture-20
[https://perma.cc/M6DW-JN5Q] (quoting WEBER, supra note 11, at 218–19). This
quote is not intended to imply that Professor Szelényi has a limited view of Max
Weber; instead, the lecture is provided as an authoritative source of the basic
instruction in Weberian philosophy that permeates public law worldwide.
19. Id. at 19:33–23:39 (quoting WEBER, supra note 11, at 320–21).
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by Weber, “the purely bureaucratic type of administrative
organization . . . is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of
attaining the highest degree of efficiency . . . .”20 Thus, this type of
organization is highly predictable.21
We may in ictu oculi notice discrepancies between what Weber
wrote about bureaucratic efficiency and the efficiency of public
administration we observe in reality. In fact, Weber himself also
wrote:
[T]here is another tendency . . . in contradiction to the
above . . . the tendency of officials to treat their official
function . . . in the interest of the welfare of those under their
authority. . . . This tendency to substantive [instrumental]
rationality is supported by all those subjected to
authority . . . [and who are] interested in the protection of
advantages already secured. The problems which open up at
this point belong in the theory of “democracy.”22

Weber was aware of what scholars have shown empirically
over the last century: public employees, like all other human beings,
will protect their jobs in the first place, more than caring for the
mission of their organization. Such crucial concern of Weber’s seem
to have been overlooked by predictably self-interested legislators
and bureaucrats who have emphasized, out of context, the slogan of
bureaucracy as “attaining the highest degree of efficiency.” What
Weber regarded as a hindsight assessment of an aspect of world
history, has been acritically, and, with self-interest, taken as an
effective prescription for the future. Even before Weber, other
classics of administrative behavior provide a different view of
organizations from the Max Weber rational and impartial model. In
fact, the notion of organizational self-serving behavior in political
science on the part of organizations goes back at least to Michels,23
who formulated the “iron law of oligarchy,” focusing his gaze on
political parties, which—once established—would only (or
primarily) hold the scope of self-perpetuation.24 A brief summary of
the thread of thinking on organizational behavior since Michels

20. Id. at 23:39–26:18 (quoting WEBER, supra note 11, at 223). Szelényi also
highlights the connection between capitalism, socialism, and bureaucracy: “the
primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic administration lies in the role of
technical knowledge . . . . Bureaucratic administration means . . . domination
through knowledge.” Id. at 26:18–34:44 (quoting WEBER, supra note 11, at 223–25).
21. WEBER, supra note 11. at 223.
22. Id. at 226.
23. ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul,
trans., 1966) (1911).
24. Id. at 342.
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includes Mayo and Barnard writing in the 1930s and 1940s,25
Charles Lindblom,26 Herbert Simon,27 William Niskanen,28 Graham
Allison,29 and Oliver Williamson.30 Throughout the twentieth
century, organizational science and micro-economics have been
revising the rational organization model. Although these thinkers
come from very different approaches and disciplines, they have a
common denominator: they would not expect rational, impartial, or
altruistic behavior from organizations. Charles Lindblom’s title
conveys the idea precisely; organizational science is “The Science of
‘Muddling Through.’”31 In fact, leveraging the organizational
behavior and microeconomics literature of the last century, an
“Administrative Behavior Hypothesis,” alternative to the Weberian
Hypothesis, could reveal itself more efficiently as a predictor of
public organizations’ behavior. In light of Professor Ackerman’s
hypotheses and U.S. schools of public administration, it is
interesting to notice that expectations of a Weberian bureaucracy
are high even in the U.S., where a Madisonian view of the State is
asserted to mark a difference vis-à-vis the Neo-Weberian State.32
The U.S. federal government, for instance, is endowed with an
Office of Government Ethics and expects a special behavior of public
employees vis-à-vis private employees.33 Most importantly from a
25. See ELTON MAYO, THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION
(1945); CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1968).
26. See Charles Edward Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
27. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 1997).
28. See William A. Niskanen, Non-Market Decision Making: The Peculiar
Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. ASS’N 293 (1968).
29. See GRAHAM T. ALLISON & PHILIP D. ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION:
EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999) (revealing the existence of the
implicit Weberian hypothesis in explaining foreign policy and exploring the
relevance and empirical value of two alternative hypotheses).
30. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595 (2000) (examining the dynamics of
principal-agent behavior).
31. See Lindblom, supra note 26.
32. See Ackerman, supra note 5.
33. U.S.
OFFICE
OF
GOV’T
ETHICS,
AGENCY
PROFILE,
https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/Resources/OGE+Agency+Profile
[https://perma.cc/9ZQ6-DNAT]; U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, STANDARDS OF
ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (2017),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/oge.nsf
/Resources/Standards+of+Ethical+Conduct+for+Employees+of+the+Executive+Bra
nch [https://perma.cc/J8PJ-FQYW]; WALTER M. SHAUB, JR., U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T
ETHICS,
CONFLICT
OF
INTEREST
PROSECUTION
SURVEY
(2015),
https://www.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/Resources/LA-1605:+2015+Conflict+of+Interest+Prosecution+Survey [https://perma.cc/26N2-QXYE].
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theoretical point of view, much of the literature criticizing the
Weberian approach to bureaucracy has been developed in the
U.S.,34 dealing with U.S. examples ranging from the Cuban missile
crisis35 to the implementation of federal programs in California.36
3. The Privileged Working Conditions for Public Employees
Contrary to common wisdom—however not unforeseen by
Weber himself, as shown above—the Weberian received view of
public employees’ working conditions has implications that make
civil service a privileged status vis-à-vis the working conditions of
the other workers in the world. In this way, public law adds a new
(or as yet unrevealed) dimension to inequality: the privileged
working conditions of public employees. This section provides some
qualitative as well as quantitative evidence of such statements.
Monopoly status of public administration organizations is the
fundamental element that characterizes public administration visà-vis the other sectors of the economy. This monopoly added to the
Weberian ‘recipes’ discussed herein generate the following three
characteristics of privilege:
1. de facto non-evaluated performance;
2. de facto lifetime employment and pension, and consequent
shelter from the economic cycle; and
3. right to strike against an agent rather than a principal.

All of the elements above will be shown by empirical evidence
henceforth.
The above are the specific qualitative consequences of the
Weberian recipes that make civil service a privileged working
status vis-à-vis the rest of the workers. These elements of the
working conditions are equivalent to a significant amount of money,
even when enjoyed in low salary conditions, and to an intangible
ease of life. In other terms, they could also be thought of as ‘shadow’
income.
Mostly, such characteristics are not stated overtly as such, but
can only be shown indirectly through quantitative evidence, that is
why we have adopted the de facto qualifier for two of them. In the
following, we provide some quantitative evidence about the four

34. See supra notes 23–30.
35. See ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 29.
36. See JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: HOW
GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (1973).
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elements stated above: monopoly, performance evaluation, shelter
from the economic cycle, and right to strike.
3.1. Empirical Evidence
First, let us concentrate on the key discriminating element of
the monopoly status of the whole bureaucracy. Such status is shown
quantitatively by the higher salary conditions vis-à-vis other sectors
of the economy, such as business firms and non-profits, that are
subject to competition. According to the neoclassical theory of the
firm, production factors (such as labor) under monopoly conditions
enjoy higher salaries than in competitive situations. Contrary to
public discourse that would have public salaries lower than private
sector salaries, global empirical evidence of self-serving behavior on
the part of public administration is provided by International
Monetary Fund data (Table 1)37 showing that the remuneration of
public administration employees worldwide is higher than in the
manufacturing sector and lower in the sole case of the (much
smaller) financial sector,38 thus debunking conventional wisdom
about underpaid public sector employees. The root cause of high
salaries is explained as a monopolistic rent by labor, labor being a
production factor of public administration’s monopoly, thus sharing
in the benefits of such monopoly status. As stated above, such
monopoly status is the crucial qualitative consequence of the
Weberian recipes.39
The figures underscored in Table 1 are also worth commenting
on: Africa has the highest public administration-to-manufacturing
wage ratios (Africa: 1.8) and a 1.9 public administration-to-GDP
ratio, implying that being a civil servant in low-income countries is
a bigger privilege than it is in non-low income countries. That
privilege is exactly what one would predict by following an
alternative “administrative behavior hypothesis,” different from the

37. BENEDICT CLEMENTS ET AL., EVALUATING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND
COMPENSATION (2010), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM7J-GE4J].
38. The financial sector is generally about one-tenth the size of public
administration. See Table 1.
39. Max Weber was very much aware of the monopoly concept. He famously used
the monopoly concept—quite originally bridging an economic concept to politics—in
his definition of the character of state power “to monopolize the use of force,” but did
not use it for bureaucracy. WEBER, supra note 11, at 56.
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Weberian hypothesis discussed above, and based on the neoWeberian literature40 of the 20th century.41
Table 1: Global public sector wages in relation to other economic
sectors
Number
of
countries
in the
study

Ratio of
average public
administration
wage to per
capita GDP

Ratio of public
administration
wage to
financial sector

Ratio of public
administration
wage to
manufacturing
sector

Africa

3

1.3

0.7

1.8

Asia and
Pacific

7

1.4

0.9

1.4

Europe

28

1.4

0.7

1.3

Western

11

1.4

0.8

1.3

8

1.2

0.5

1.3

17

1.3

0.7

1.3

4

1.9

0.7

1.4

35

1.4

0.6

1.4

18

1.2

0.8

1.3

Hemisphere
Middle East
and Central
Asia
European
Union
Low-income
Countries
Middleincome
Countries
High-income
Countries

About the specific U.S. situation within this global picture, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that federal
employees’ salaries compare with their private sector counterparts
in a range going from about minus 30% (for the higher ranks) to
40. CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 119 (3d ed.
1986) (defining neo-Weberian). Neo-Weberian literature here is not to be confused
with the literature on the Neo-Weberian State. See Ackerman, supra note 5. For a
complete discussion of the neo-Weberian literature of the 20th century, see Paolo
D’Anselmi, Can We Afford to Separate Politics from Administration? Designing
Powers in the Service of Implementation, 5 IT. L.J., no. 2 (forthcoming Jan. 2020).
41. See MAYO, supra note 25; MICHELS, supra note 23; SIMON, supra note 27;
Lindblom, supra note 26; Szelényi, supra note 18.
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about plus 30% (for the lower ranks). 42 Such evidence is consistent
with the notion of privilege below the line of wealth, and the very
notion of privilege through easier working conditions, rather than
by salary and financial wealth. Such evidence also shows the
monopoly situation takes place more in the lower ranks, still
consistent with expectations.
Coming now to the three characteristics of the privileged
working conditions, not surprisingly we notice that U.S. academic
attention and study of the Weberian hypotheses in public
management, as noted above,43 coupled with political attention and
debate over the Madisonian state,44 have generated in the U.S.
some curbing of the privilege. In fact, we can probably observe
globally a continuous spectrum of the privilege phenomenon
whereby the Anglo-Saxon tradition of public service experiences
lower privilege. Table 1 shows that salary differences are more
marked in Low-income Countries.
The first two characteristics of privilege—(1) de facto nonevaluated performance; and (2) de facto lifetime employment and
pension, and consequent shelter from the economic cycle—are not
enforced by statutory rules. However, their de facto prevalence in
reality can be shown ‘not false’ through some statistics. For
example, quits rates by industry show significantly different
numbers: government, 0.8, vs. total private, 2.5.45 Such a difference,
consistent over time,46 could be a sign of consistently positive
evaluations of employee performance [characteristic 1] and securer
job position vis-à-vis the economic cycle [characteristic 2]. It is
important here that governmental sources are cited since the

42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RESULTS OF STUDIES ON FEDERAL PAY
VARIED DUE TO DIFFERING METHODOLOGIES 23 (2012), https://www.gao.gov
/assets/600/591817.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS8L-QR4S]. To provide a feeling for the
global continuous spectrum of specific country situations, in Italy, the 2014 Spending
Review study found that public employees’ salaries had been consistently higher by
approximately 27.5% vis-à-vis their private sector counterparts over the last 30
years. IL COMMISSARIO STRAORDINARIO PER LA REVISIONE DELLA SPESA PUBBLICA,
PROPOSTE PER UNA REVISIONE DELLA SPESA PUBBLICA (2014-16), 16 (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://revisioned
ellaspesa.gov.it/documenti/prime_proposte_per_una_revisione_della_spesa_xfinalex
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQA2-54D3].
43. See supra notes 4, 18, 23–27.
44. See Ackerman, supra note 5.
45. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE 4. QUITS LEVELS AND RATES BY
INDUSTRY AND REGION, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (June 2019), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/jolts.t04.htm [https://perma.cc/4BD8-TBDL].
46. See Charlotte Oslund, Which Industries Need Workers? Exploring Differences
in Labor Market Activity, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS: MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Jan.
2016), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2016.1 [https://perma.cc/2DPU-G4FR].
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argument may get very political and be frustrated from this paper’s
point of view.47
Still about performance evaluation, “about 99 percent of
permanent, non-[Senior Executive Status] employees received a
rating at or above ‘fully successful.’” About 61 percent of employees
were rated as ‘outstanding’ (33.1 percent) or ‘exceeds fully
successful’ (27.4 percent).”48 The 99 percent pass rate motivates the
de facto non-evaluation of performance statement.49
The third statement—right to strike against an agent rather
than a principal—needs some clarification in itself. The statement
makes reference to the principal-agent theory.50 One element
justifying the right for workers to strike is the self-restraining
condition whereby the strike takes place in industrial action that
sees the confrontation of two principals: the workers and the owners
of the firm, both acting for their own interest and money. Such
situations appear in equilibrium; both parties are furthering their
own personal interest and have also an incentive for self-restraint,
e.g. to avoid their firm losing market traction thus jeopardizing both
parties, the owners and the workers. On the other hand, when the
right to strike is granted to government workers, the confrontation
necessarily sees principals (the workers) vis-à-vis a counterpart
that does not act on behalf of their own money. Such counterparts,
be it the President, the Parliament, or an Agency, find themselves
in the position of an agent, thus making the confrontation
unbalanced, or at least qualitatively less accountable than private
sector confrontations.
U.S. government workers, e.g. federal employees, do not seem
to enjoy the right to strike, at least in order to further their economic
salaries. The procedure to set federal employee salaries is defined,
and the final decision ultimately belongs to the President of the
47. Such statistics are likely to represent a lower bound of the public-private
divide because they include turnover generated by age and retirement, besides nonvoluntary separations. If one were able to look at non-voluntary separations, a bigger
difference would probably be found.
48. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DISTRIBUTION OF PERFORMANCE
RATINGS ACROSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 2013, 5 (2016), https://www.gao
.gov/assets/680/676998.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW6R-Y6FR] (providing examples from
the continuous spectrum of country-specific situations, citing that the harshest
measure the self-governing body of the magistrates in Italy can impose on one of
their members is relocation to another city).
49. A counterpart to de facto non-evaluation of performance can be found in the
emphasis that is oftentimes placed in the harshness of entrance examinations into
public service, which goes back to Hegel. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S
‘PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT’ 50–51 (Annette Jolin & Joseph O’Malley trans., Joseph
O’Malley ed., 1970).
50. Williamson, supra note 30.
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United States.51 Therefore, this third condition cannot be shown as
applicable to the U.S. public administration’s context. This
situation differs, for instance, from the Italian context whereby the
right to strike is granted in the constitution. 52
3.2. Further Evidence
Further qualitative evidence about the pursuit of special
status for public employees is provided by the following phenomena:
1. public discourse and international public organizations’
striving to create a class of civil servants;53
2. the very use of the phrase “civil servant” identifies a different
species of people than “public employee” would;54
3. considering itself per se efficient, the bureaucracy claims it
operates at the feasibility frontier,55 as shown by the following
sub-points:
3.1. the limited results of spending review efforts;56
3.2. the need of new programs for specific and additional
funding;57
3.3. the backlog is assumed as a symptom of heavy
workload and the cause of bureau ineffectiveness, which
becomes an opportunity to claim understaffing and blame
the citizenry rather than the bureaucracy itself (e.g. the

51.
52.
53.
54.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 5–6.
Art. 40 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (providing the right to strike).
Ackerman, supra note 5; Albrow, supra note 8.
Andrea Lapiccirella, On Bureaucratic Behavior, in PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AS
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 103, 107–09 (Massimiliano Di Bitetto,
Athanasios Chymis & Paolo D’Anselmi eds., 2015).
55. See AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 213 (2d
ed. 1974) (describing how one branch of the government blames another for imperfect
budgets arguing that the budget would operate effectively if the other branch only
cooperated with the first branch); Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare
Maximization, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22–59 (Mar. 1957).
56. Compare CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, IL CONTROLLO DELLA SPESA PUBBLICA E LA
SPENDING REV. 4 (2019) (finding a reduction of around 1.3 billion euro was necessary
in the latest spending review in Italy), with Capire per Conoscere, Puntata n.209,
Mario
Baldassarri
(Apr.
15,
2019),
http://www.mariobaldassarri
.net/site/2019/04/15/capire-per-conoscere-puntata-n-209-del-15-aprile-2019
[https://perma.cc/73J7-6ZS2] (discussing waste in the same budget), and MARIO
BALDASSARRI, QUARANT’ANNI DI SPENDING REVIEW: L’ITALIA AL BIVIO SUI TAGLI DI
SPESA (2018).
57. The Italian military mission to Afghanistan had to be specifically and
additionally funded, notwithstanding the several billion euro budget of the
organizations that were involved. MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, DOCUMENTO
PROGRAMMATICO PLURIENNALE PER LA DIFESA PER IL TRIENNIO 2018-2020, 92, 155–
56 (2018), https://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/DPP_2018_2020_15_ottobre_
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/N52D-9SX3].
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backlog of pending lawsuits is blamed on the high
“litigiosity” of the population).58
4. thematization that failure is due to imperfect application of
the Weberian recipes and there is need for more controls.59

The major symptom is this received and popularized view of
Max Weber permeates public law without amendment. Public law,
based on a limited and self-serving understanding of Max Weber’s
theory of bureaucracy, adds one dimension to inequality that is
wholly man-made and sanctioned by the law.
4. Relevance, Limitations, and Recommendations
The privileged conditions constitute a relevant global justice
issue, applying to an estimated half billion employees of public
administration globally.60 Such conditions create ‘mass privilege,’
an oxymoron with vast consequences. In fact, working conditions
privilege might very well constitute the other side of the
government ineffectiveness coin.61 It is however crucial to the
stability of this argument that government ineffectiveness not be
brought in the discussion as proof of the existence of the privilege.
Government ineffectiveness can be very elusive to show and to
pinpoint. The argument is strictly about the inputs to public
58. MINISTERO DELLA GIUSTIZIA, RELAZIONE SULLA PERFORMANCE 2011 DIPARTIMENTO DELL'ORGANIZZAZIONE GIUDIZIARIA, DEL PERSONALE E DEI SERVIZI
(2012),
https://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/contentview.page?contentId=ART779081&previ
siousPage=mg_14_7 [https://perma.cc/Y658-T9NM] (“Questo elevato tasso di
litigiosità potrebbe derivare da una propensione socio-culturale italiana alla
conflittualità . . . .”) (“This high rate of litigiosity could derive from an italian sociocultural propensity to conflict . . . .”).
59. Ackerman, supra note 5.
60. This article takes ‘the view from below’ to public administration, and it
argues the basic Weberian conditions apply to all civil servants worldwide. The
phrase is borrowed from Ralph S. Brower & Mitchel Y. Abolafia, Bureaucratic
Politics: The View from Below, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 305 (1997).
61. See generally EDELMAN, EDELMAN TRUST BAROMETER GLOBAL REPORT
(2018), https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2018-10/2018_Edelma
n_Trust_Barometer_Global_Report_FEB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SL5Y-8XS2];
MCKINSEY CTR FOR GOV’T, DELIVERING FOR CITIZENS: HOW TO TRIPLE THE SUCCESS
RATE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFORMATIONS (2018), https://www.mckinsey.com/
~/media/McKinsey/Industries
/Public%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Delivering%20for%20citizens%20How%20to%20
triple%20the%20success%20rate%20of%20government%20transformations/Deliver
ing-for-citizens-executive-summary.ashx [https://perma.cc/8PFV-XKX4]; Worldwide
Governance Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi
[https://perma.cc/X3J9-JB5A].
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administration: the privileged status of its labor force. Whether
such privileged status may have anything to do with government
ineffectiveness is only hinted here as a theme for future research.
On the other hand, arguments about salaries being geared to
education, experience, tough selection at entry, and other variables,
should take into account that much of the comparative salary
literature deals with competitive labor markets. What is missing in
the case of public administration is exactly competition. And
competition is missing because the Weberian paradigm is
hegemonic in public law and public administration. We go back
again to the idea of public administration’s monopoly status.
The discussion takes salaries into account only as a proof of
the existence of the monopoly status and the consequent privileged
conditions. Instead, the inequality focus centers around the three
dimensions of privilege stated above:
1. de facto non-evaluated performance;
2. de facto lifetime employment and pension, and consequent
shelter from the economic cycle; and
3. right to strike against an agent rather than a principal.

The mass privilege enjoyed by civil servants is as elusive as it
is ‘privilege below the threshold of wealth.’ Most of the time it is not
conspicuous. In fact, it shows itself in the humblest of jobs, which
are nonetheless privileged vis-à-vis their private sector
counterparts as they enjoy shadow income through easier working
conditions and intangible value. Such privilege has mass nature,
involving at least one seventh (slightly less than 15%) of the
employed population globally: one half billion over a total employed
population estimated at 3.5 billion.62 The vast dissemination of this
inequality made by law accounts for its stability, its own hegemony
in public discourse (e.g. in the public narrative of lower pay public
jobs), the difficulty in revealing it, and the difficulty in containing
it.
Recommendations about amendment of such inequality in the
working conditions of public employees should strictly avoid
possible salary cuts. Differences on salaries have not been shown
here as an item of privilege, thus underlining that privilege can take
a very different and yet pervasive turn, bypassing money. Salaries
62. This estimate is based on available statistics from: the International Labour
Office, the OECD, specific statistics from China, and personal communication about
India. Data interpolation was used to estimate values for other countries. The
Microsoft Excel file is available upon request.
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are only effects of monopoly; the spirit of the recommendation then
is to remove some of the monopoly status, while keeping the same
organizational structure, only changing the personnel system. 63 The
remedy should not be about punishment; the remedy should be
about sharing the intangible benefit of being a public employee. On
the other hand, for sake of effectiveness of public administration
and of the economy in general, it is key that employees rotate
between the public and the private sector, thus generating a
possibly productive dynamism. Civil service jobs could also be made
as medium-term jobs (e.g. 5 or 10 years), then persons employed in
the public administration should go back to the private sector and
new employees should be taken in from the private sector into the
public administration. Such an arrangement should be
implemented through staggered personnel turnover, making sure
there is overlap and smooth transition within jobs and
organizations. Necessity for continuing education and continuing
evolution of public and private organizations would be a
consequence of such an organizational arrangement. However, such
new arrangements are already a necessity of our age.
The Weberian idea of “domination through knowledge”64 is
still valid today, but it can no longer be implemented through
monopolistic practice. “[D]omination through knowledge”65 today is
probably part of “soft power,”66 and it is exerted in much more
complex and sophisticated ways. Only a few years after Weber
wrote his works, Antonio Gramsci67 formulated the ancestor
concept of soft power: hegemony, whereby the abstract plane of doxy
is dominated that influences both orthodox and heterodox points of
view.
“Neo” elements of the Neo-Weberian State reinforce the notion
of “[a] professionalization of the public service, so that the
‘bureaucrat’ becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his
or her sphere of activity, but also a professional manager, oriented

63. Monopoly has at least two facets: (1) monopoly of organizational structures;
(2) monopoly of the labor force working within monopolistic structures. Here, this
Paper proposes to remove the second type of monopoly. Future studies could
investigate the possible removal of the first type of monopoly, as well, beyond New
Public Management.
64. Weber, supra note 11, at 225.
65. Id. at 225.
66. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004).
67. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO
GRAMSCI (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds. & trans., International
Publishers 2018) (1971).
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to meeting the needs of his/her citizen/users.”68 This notion appears
to be a new version of the “domination through knowledge,” 69 which
can acquire an eerie connotation in the era of the Internet,
algorithms, and profiling of individuals.
Such recommendations, which are not focused on the
abatement of salaries, but on the dissemination of the experience of
being a government employee—and, by the same token, the
dissemination of the experience of being a private sector employee—
appear to be very much egalitarian ones. It could be argued that
lifetime stability of citizens in either status, public or private
employee, may lead to a reverse form of that “corrosion of character”
that has captured the imagination of scholars and general readers. 70
The recommendation may give the individuals a glimpse of that
well-balanced “original position” that John Rawls saw as a device
for the generation of the individual’s preferences in the just
society.71 The individual’s point of view could change for the better,
due to a cross-sector work experience over a lifetime. Consequently,
the “burdens of judgement”72 could be mitigated thanks to a more
diverse individual work experience in their lifetime.
The problem that is identified and the solving arrangement
that is proposed here are not completely novel. On the one hand,
this all takes the shape of a ‘dual labor market,’73 albeit that theory
did not identify the law-made nature of the dual labor market. The
present theory can be thought of as a special, law-made case of that
general theory. On the other hand, New Public Management (NPM)
has generated some of the kind of dynamic that is envisioned here,
through the concepts of public value74 and of the contracting state.75
However, NPM, as implemented in the U.S. and in the U.K.,

68. POLLITT & BOUCKAERT, supra note 6, at 119.
69. Weber, supra note 11, at 225.
70. This statement is probably a point of view about the argument of his book to
which Richard Sennett would not subscribe. RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF
CHARACTER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW CAPITALISM
(1999).
71. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 304–10 (2005).
72. Id. at 54–58.
73. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
74. See Herman B. Leonard & Mark H. Moore, Pursuing Public Value:
Frameworks for Strategic Analysis and Action, in PORTS IN A STORM: PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT IN A TURBULENT WORLD 84 (John D. Donahue & Mark H. Moore eds.,
2012).
75. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 338–
92 (3d ed. 2009).
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appears to have had in mind quick (and nonetheless stable) wins. 76
NPM is not concerned about the root problem: the Weberian theory
underlying public administration organization as determined by
public law. On the other hand, NPM is limited to public services; it
does not get into core public administration. Rotation across the
private and public sectors of the economy needs to be extended to
all public administrations. The possible benefits resulting from such
arrangements appear to overcome the alleged costs from loss of
experience, expertise, and seniority. Worst case, what is lost in one
sector, is gained in the other sector, public or private; best case,
rotation revitalizes the energy of people employed, and crossfertilization of experience could be fruitful for society and the
economy.
5. Conclusion and Future Studies
This paper proposes the thesis that careers in public
administration are a form of privilege and inequality and
recommends a possible remedy. This paper establishes the
existence of a new dimension of inequality that has been not very
much explored: the privilege of being an employee of public
administration as sanctioned by public law, following the Weberian
theory of bureaucracy. Part of the argument proposed here (the
existence of privilege) is not new; what is new is the specification of
such privilege in the working conditions rather than salary and the
tracing of the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of it
through law and mainstream theory.
Future studies should start from the limitations of this paper
and develop more quantitative evidence about the existence of the
dimension of inequality that is argued here. Top priority should be
given to the establishment and acknowledgement of such
inequality, and the existence of the problem. For instance, evidence
could be collected about the lower turnover of personnel in the
public administration than in the private sector. Such evidence
would be synergic with the existence of privilege in the public
administration. Also, the ratio of the number of available posts to
the number of participants entering in public vis-à-vis private
contests for jobs could be an interesting indicator of the distorted
extra appeal of public administration jobs. Much of this evidence
can be collected only on a specific country basis, which should be

76. A. C. L. Davies, Beyond New Public Management: Problems of Accountability
in the Modern Administrative State, in ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTION 333, 333–53 (Nicholas Bamforth & Peter Leyland eds., 2013).
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thought of as a contribution to comparative literature, rather than
as a parochial issue. Further recommendations on how to amend
inequality—detailing or integrating the remedy of rotation—could
occupy another chapter of future studies.
On the theoretical side, the underpinnings of this inequality
could be traced through the insufficiency of Max Weber’s received
recipes as a way to predict organizational behavior in public
administration.
An
alternative
Administrative
Behavior
Hypothesis77 should be investigated, leveraging the organizational
behavior and microeconomics literature of the last century. The
implications of such alternative hypothesis would be profound on
public law worldwide.
If the discussion has shown a possible pathway to unravel
unintended consequences of the Weberian recipes, this same
pathway could lead to a generalization about the conceptual
inadequacy of the same Weberian recipes as effective predictors of
public administration organizational structures’ optimal behavior
altogether. What is at stake is the very “rational-legal” source of
authority, in the classical Weberian three-partite taxonomy,78 that
may need further investigation, because that source is based on the
same Weberian recipes.79 One could at this point ask the question:
public administration is probably rational, but for whom? Rationality
might be in the intentions of bureaucracy and of the legislators—
these would be inputs to the process of public governance—but is
there rationality in their consequences, i.e. in the outputs and the
outcomes of public administration action? The very notion of
bureaucratic rationality is at stake. If it can be shown that at least in
part the way we have interpreted and implemented Max Weber’s
legacy has led to unintended consequences, maybe that same
interpretation may prove questionable in other fields, such as the
entire organizational arrangements of public administration.

77. SIMON, supra note 27.
78. WEBER, supra note 11, at 926–38.
79. A philological study is underway because Max Weber himself apparently
never formulated the third pure type of authority as “rational-legal.” See WEBER,
supra note 11.

